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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses occupational choice,behaviour ofa.individuals -in ruraLGujara:t 
in Western India. It examines the economic rationale for holding single or 
multiple jobs and undertaking self or wage employment. The analysis suggests that 
persons who undertake multiple jobs are younger, less educated, are faced with 
lower wage rates and live further .. away from towns •.The influence of the.._value of 
physical capital. on ·job choices is complex .. The polychotomous legit .model 
suggests that higher value of land and other assets encourage diversification 
into a second activity, except at a very high value of '-land, among the self­
employed. · Further disaggregation,· however, reveals that while this is .truedor 
self-employed men..:.with ,.landt- landless -self-employed men prefer to. specialize ,in. 
a ''single activity. Moreover, self-employed workers, with land also tend to• 
undertake two activities in.different sectors. This can be interpreted as risk­
averse diversification. 
KEY WORDS: Occupational Choice, Multiple- Job .Holding,.· Labor Market 
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INTRODUCTION 
In developed , countries. only a small proportion of the labor force is . self 
',.. employed compared: to ,·the developing :,-countries. ·In the latter 'countrie.s, self 
employment is not always transitional, low. earning,. low status work. In the 
literature, many studies have modeled self employment as an explicit occupational 
choice with earnings.profiles distinctly different from wage employment (Blaug, 
1974; Fields· and Schultz, · 1982; Huffman, 1980; Blau\ 1985; Chiswick, 1977; 
.Vijverberg, .1982;>Hill, 1983 and 1989; Henderson,,..1983; Khandker, 1987; Sumner•, 
1981; Rees and Shah, 1986; Moore, 1983). The selection -bias in the earnings 
(wage) equation arising from finch an occupational choice, has been dealt with in 
a variety of ways.·· In these studies, .however,· the two types of activities -are 
·,,,. treated as alternatives and· they· are ·rarely hypothesized to be performe'd 
simultaneously by the same individual. 
The issue of multiple job holdings has been addressed much less in the 
literature. In a developed country like the U.S. only 5.4 percent of all 
employed persons in 1985 held multiple jobs (Stinson, 1986). In developing 
· , , , ,.. countries holding more ·than .-one ,job. is :more .,common.,'t,1The ,.estimates vary,a,from ,27 
percent' for male workers.· in Malayasia · in ·'1976 (Schaffner and Cooper, ... 1991), to 
50 percent in rural Gujarat in India in 1987~88 (survey data analysed~in this 
.paper) . A person holding two or·. more jobs has . been. treated in the developed 
countries as moonlighting, or participating in the secondary labor market. The 
main rationale given for holding a second job was·restriction on the number of 
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, hours worked on the first job ,(Shisko .and Rostker, 1976). Schaffner and,Cooper 
. , .,.(1991) ,,analyse further-such..:.rational.es ,in.,a .. developing.,country.,context~-Multiple. 
''''< ,,,; ..,job-•·hoiding·among·farm famil0 ies·:in-~developed countri:es·has·beenthe -focus·,·o-fa·some 
studies (Hallberg, et.al., 1991). 
dn this-•,paper I ,focus:c,on,,multiple.job .holdi:ng..,in· rural·.Tndia ·.in;the state,,:of 
Gujarat. The possible rationales for multiple• job choices are outlined in the 
next section. Two main reasons for diversification into a second job are 
restrictions on the hours of work in the first job which is below the desired 
labor' supply;, and uncertainty in ·income streams from the first ·job. In rural 
.• .,,India seasonalLty. , of employment in agriculture and related non-agricultural 
activities act as. a ·restriction..on. the hours in both self.. and wage employment .. 
This might lead to diversification into a second wage or self employed job . 
.,,Uncertainty in. weather ....,conditions _. -and risks , in .....production ,..also .encourage 
diversification into a second job whose risks are less than perfectly correlated 
the first issue of restriction on hours explicitly, but do not include 
uncertainty and risk directly. However, we hope that a discussion of multiple 
jobs in a single period will provide clues to household behavior when faced with 
.uncertainty and risk in production and wage employment1 .,, 
1 Many of the concepts._..developed in this section are based on Schaffner and 
Cooper, 1991, and on discusSionswith Julie Schaffner. 
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..-RATIONALE FOR MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING 
The standard labor. supply"'model~·as-sumes that a worker'·s· wage ·depends,,on -human 
and Heckman, 1986). This model·-is extended to include multiple jobs by assuming 
that while the marginal wage at off-farm (wage) employment is independent .,of 
employed jobs) is downward sloping (Sumner, 1991). 'In the. agricultural household 
model, rational individuals are assumed to participate in off-farm work when 
their reservation wage (for farm and home uses of time) is less than the off-farm 
wage-rate offered in the market' (Huffman, 1991; Singh, Squire and Strauss, 
1986). 
In the model outlined below the decisions regarding single or multiple and self 
or, wage job choices are assumed to be .. taken simultaneously by the individual 
worker2 • Five explicit occupational choices listed below are considered: 
4.: ·only'one·wage job; 
2. only one self employed job; 
3 ...one,. sel£..employed and one wage job; 
4. two self employed jobs; and 
5. two wage jobs. 
Another option open to a self employed person is to sell his assets and 
specialize in wage employment, but in that case he would be considered a wage 
,employee ..f.or .. our purpo.s.e.s ....ln....the...utiLity .,maximization .framework cithe .....per...son 
2The standard model does not consider multiple job holdings. However, Gronau 
, •(1977) formalized a distinction between home production, leisure and work ·in "the 
~- market. The choice was between three alternatives -rather than just-work and 
leisure. The person maximizes the amount of commodity Z, which is a combination 
,,,.., .. of ,goods and services~and_consumption time,, subject to,.a budget constr.aint..and 
a time constraint. This model is useful in thinking about multiple jobs such as 
a combination of self employment and wage employment and leisure. 
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·"'·"" , . ,;"". ,_·;;..chooses,,the total supply... of .. labor~.,simultaneously with ,the hours allocation 
.. betweenJ obs ...This. choice.,is-a.lso,-guided.by-exogeneous ...factors ,such as..,.i-ndi:v.idual 
Labor supply decisions .of the .indi:v:i.duaL are.slewed .as......a ...r.e.sult..,0£... utility 
·· ,maximization ,subject.,to·•-constraints ,on ··human•'.time .and ,income. ··The individual 
faces a variety of wage and non-wage job opportunities and seeks to maximize 
utility from leisure L, a vector of purchased goods C and a vector of factors 
exogeneous to current consumption decisions X, such as individual, household and 
regional characteristics. The utility function 
U = U(C, L, X) (1) 
isto be maximized subject0 to a time constraint, 
T = + h 2 + L (2)h 1 
where h 1 and h 2 are days allocated to the two jobs. A second constraint is the 
total income received from,the,·two jobs,.which·i.s spent on the market goods,··rand 
· ····r,·"·'··"•''"•••,will""'for•4 ·"i:llustrative::·purpose·s:: be:.:-as·sumed to include·r··as· an·,~•optimum..;..one · se"l.f ... 
• e,mployed job .and ..one. wage job. 
(3) 
The marginal earnings from the first self employed job, is a declining function 
of the days spent on it, h 1 , and A1 is a vector describing asset ownership. w2 
...,iis·,the .wage on. the ..s.eco.nd.~J.ob,,~which-~is,.,.assumed;~•tOsJ,Jhe..,..a ..~wage Job-w.i.:th,...wages 
constant regardless of hours worked. Y is non labor income . 
..A.,general,utility funct-ion.for,,a ,person,with,one,,self,.employedjob~and.one.,wage 
job can be written as 
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zero at the maximum, 
az au aF au = = 0 (5)ah1 ac ah1 aL 
az au au = = (6)ah2 acw2 aL 
0 
The marginal returns to labor on the first self employed job, 8F/8h1 , declines 
as more .time,,,.is dav:oted to it (curve ABE in Figure 1), while the marginal wage 
on the second wage job, w2 , is constant (the straight line w2BC). 
If w2 < 8F/8h1 , evaluated at h 1 = T - , L, a second wage job would not be 
undertaken and equilibrium would be reached at E with h* days of labor (case 2), 
where the marginal value-of the self· employed.,job just equals the marginal rate 
.,,,,.c;,of.. ,.subs.titution, between ,le.isure .and •income. ,as ·in equation 5; · 
= au/aL (7)au;ac 
This is the point where the curve ABE intersects with the·labor supply curve S. 
The labor supply curve indicates the individual's reservation wage, or minimum 
,wageurequired ,for,•an ,addistional •hour o•O•f.,.work....The; posLtion.,of ,this cu:rve,~depends 
on total income in the optimum ·and· is-•jointly determined with equilibrium hours 
by the exogeneous characteristics ,.,,X,. The individual will undertake a second wage 
job, h 2 > 0, if w2 = 8F/8h1 (say at B), then an equilibrium is reached as ·in 




w. = au/aL <a>
2 au;ac 
·• The. marginal.ireturns to ..labor"'curve ,becomes ,horizontal at B ,and, equal•s "the"market 
wage rate wi3. In other words, for labor use less than or equal to the value-at 
·. ..:B ;•, 'say, :hi::, ..,it;· is :-better .•,.to,,be, self,,;empl.oyed,,and1-,any.,add:i:tiLonal.,;labor.,use-ccbeyond 
· h 1 is allocated-to -wage labor, h 2 = H - •hi (case 3) where H is total time devoted 
to work (H = T - L). 
For a person who undertakes two self employed jobs, the marginal earnings from 
the second job would be another declining function of the days, h 2 , spent on it, 
, G(h2 ,A2 ), ,where. A2 is a. second vector of assets. The general utility function can 
be written as 
, . •.··••· ,, , The partial .. derivative with -~respect. to...h 1 , and h 2 would be .. 
au (10)aL = O 
az _ au aG _ au = 0 <11>ah2 - ac ah2 aL 
At equilibrium, 
= au/aL (12).au;ac 
which is reached where the marginal productivity of. labor on the two jobs are 
equal and that. is equal to the marginal rate- of substitution between consumption 
3It is assumed that entry into the market is costless. The introduction of 
cost· involved, in terms of money and time,•,,•requires some modification of the 
income.and time constraints (see Gronau, 1977). 
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·i:.,,:and leisure. In Figure 2, this .is .cShown geometrically as the equality between 
employed in one activity cannot be shifted to the other, this equilibrium can be 
composite.marginal productivity of labor curve for the two jobs together, and the 
labor supply curve Sat C. It is not necessary for the marginal productivity 
curves to intersect for the individual to undertake two self employed jobs. This 
can ,occur due to some external factor such as seasonality of the work on the 
first activity. 
In the context of developed countries the typical explanation for the existence 
of two wae;e johs, with the second job being lower paying, is rationing of hours 
on the first job. 'An individuals' willingness to take on ·a second job depends on 
whether he can work.enough hours at his prevailing primary wage rate to satisfy 
to .,a, .constraint that 
(13) 
where h 1r is the hours ration determined by the employer and is lower than the 
desired supply of hours to the first job. The Lagrangian function for a person 
, with two wage jobs can be .written .as 
where w1 and w2 are wages on the two jobs, . w2 < w1 , and h1 and h 2 are days spent 
on the two jobs . .X is a La-grange··multipHer ·on the,additional constraint; ·Tire 
partial derivatives with respect,to h 1 and h2 are 
8 
az = au au _ 1 = 0 <15 >ah 
1 
acw1 - ar.. 
(16) 
If .A = 0 at equilibrium, the constraint is not binding, the individual undertakes 
only one wage job ( case 1) . He chooses the job which offers the higher wages; so 
that 
if W1 > Wz, h1 > 0, and h2 0, he chooses the first job with h 1 days, 
if Wz < W1, h1 .0, ar,id h2 > 0, he chooses the second job with h 2 days. 
, .The ,indi:v:iduaL.wilLundertake two wage jobs if >. > 0, h1 = h1r, and equilibrium 
is reached as in equation 16, at point D in Figure 3 (case 5). 
w. = au/aL (l?)
2 au;ac 
, , In Figure 3 w1.. indicates the high ..wage-.,in the,:first._. activity with" a-restriction 
- - on .the number of-days•,1f•'hir, .,avai,lable· on the job/ -w2 -indicates the lower•wage-'·on 
and h 2 = H,.c., h 1r days, to- the second .lower paying job. His marginal ,returns to 
0 labor curve is,;,ABCD .-At•0 D- equilibrium ~is ··reached where this -curve intersects "With 
the labor supply curve LS. For convenience the second job is assumed to be a wage 
job. It is also possible that the second activity is self employment, but the 
marginal productivity on this.job.is lower .than.the wage obtained in the -first 
job-. The marginal returns ..schedule .for. the.,.second job would be declining::.:betweert 
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, " ,,,., , ,B and ,,D, intersecting the«•labor. ,supply--curve at D4 • 
: HYPOTHESES ,FOR STUDY 
Three kinds·· of variables are hypothesized to-, influence "occupational choice in 
this model: 
l.Human capital: age and education; 
2. Physical capital: value of land holding and value of other productive assets; 
and 
3.External regional factors: village wage rate and distance from the nearest 
town. 
:i ·Tent~itiLNa,"hy;p.o.thes.es,..t.:e.garding, the .influence of these variables ,are discussed 
below. 
•. According to the model of the decision regarding undertaking single or multiple 
jobs, either self or wage .employment, .. depends on alL the ,exogenous variables that 
,.. enter the.reservation.wage,.,equation.,, ,.earnings function, (for the -,self.employed) 
treated as such exogeneous variables. The reservation wage of an individual would 
depend.on the characteristics .of. other members, of .hisfner..,household. ,,Tnis has not 
,.been included in this model,. but, forms the basis .for a ,subsequent paper.,on a 
matched sample of married couples . 
.. ~4It·•is ,however, possible.:for•-persons ,to"hold only.·one job-- (h2 •O); if at 
w. > au/aL > w. 
1 au;ac 2 
In figure 2, this occurs if the supply curve.passes through the segment BC of 
the marginal returns schedule. But in ,the data, we ,,cannot distinguish between 
these single job holders and the earlier ones with labor supply schedules between 
A and B. 
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.\ The effects of human capital on the wage labor participation decision of farm 
1-tf:-, ,. ·"h.' ~.:.•.•,«:~..:,,.,, ,,,,opara to:r;;s.~,or""""the.. ,,mul.ti,pJ..e,.,,J.ob,.c1,ho,ld,ing"*rdeois,ion,,,.a:rr,e:,~,,amhiguous,r:,,LHuman"c;;capiat-a,i:• 
· ,,,, .. , .. ,,,.,. ,.·•enhances· an·•individual' s·performance in ·farm s•operations·;,·'thereby,,.increas·ing""'the· 
shadow value of labor. The value of off-farm labor is similarly increased. The 
actual effects on the participation decision is left as an. empirical issue' 
(Lass, Findeis and Hallberg, 1991). Among wage employees with no assets, better 
educated workers may have a higher reservation wage and may also be expected to 
have a higher wage offer. Only one wage job is likely to be the preferred choice 
unless hours worked as wage earners are·rationed. 
c.r Asset , ownership ,may encourage single self employed jobs. Higher levels ,. of 
physical capital (-asset ownership) would imply a higher marginal productivity 
, curve on· the first job; •The income' effect of t:hP. ·higher. asset value may ·also 
/raise- the reservation wage ~and 0 shi.ft ·the ·labor supply curve "Upwards -reducing "the 
need for a second joh. To the extent that asset accumulation occurs with age; 
single jobs may be associated with higher age. 
An increase in the wage rate may reduce the supply of ·labor if there is a 
backward bending supply curve, i.e. , the income effect outweighs the compensated 
wage effect. An increase in the wage on the second job may reduce the number of 
·days supplied to it because the-,income.,needs,,ar,e,satis.fied·0with fewer·:hours'o·f 
· work·. Obviously it is difficult to predict··the exact position of the ·curves\ •·but 
we have many reasons to expect the-backward bending curve to emerge•forpersons 
engaged on more hours of work at that wage . 
.. For self, employed persons who do undertake a. second wage job an increase in -the 
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,,, ,-~ ,market wage could reduce.days,,supplied to.self employment and increase,.market 
--,'.► . ..; ... ,.,,.;,,•"·'•' ~c,,,,,,,,,,.w;o;rk'°"..T,he.i£.f£ec.t_,on~.l.eisur.e..i,s:,.:i.t1detea::mi.na.te.,hac.a);lsa""the.~inc,ome,,,e.f£ect..•woul~d 
· .. :, ,,, ,n ""· ·>-•,,to·sincre·asec:,it"whi'l·e •the'- substitutiont:effect 0 would :re-duce·<it/·The ··exact,'.·,pos'ittbn 
of the labor supply curve is not clear. 
Employment opportunities arising from access to a nearby town together with 
possibly higher wage levels in the urban areas could be hypothesized to encourage 
single wage and salaried jobs. 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
. , ,, :hi .GuJarat....is ... ,,an~..industrially .and"agriculturallT·-developed state .located in -the 
"' . western part of India. There are, however, significant intra-stateNariations--in 
levels of industr.ialization and.agricultural. development,·--A,-,signi-ficant part-of 
the ,state ,...,is, ....semi:,-.a:r:id ..,.w.ith ...limited...irrigation, ..,facilities ... -Bulk-....of. the 
agricultural activity in" this region is,.undertaken during.July to~,January,., the-
,.,.·,official ··'monsoon' · and··winter seasons ; 
A primary, survey was conducted in thirty villages belonging to five districts of 
Gujarat state in India in 1988-89. 3760 households were selected using a 
stratified random sample. The households in each village were stratified into 
. -~----· ,,.four categories, viz.,, cultivators, -agriculturah,:laborers, ,household·:·•indust~ry 
(including skilled workers) and others. Information on individual and employment 
, characteristics of , all ".members of.... the -,chousehold.,. and ..household asse.ts was 
,_1, collected for the year 1987-88, which was a,drought~.year. This forms-the data ,for 
estimating the occupational choice model .in.this.study. 
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.,,. , ,,...~, ,..1\,A major limitation of these data was that.. mo. information. was collected on wages 
1,.,N,,A-;,:i:1,..,,,.,,.>,;;;;,:%,:,.,·.~,an.d•,,ea,r:n-:i:ngs,,,,0£0:"i-ndi:vidual<S'f."·,'Henc·e•,.:d,,t•;was~not11:,p·os'S'.i::b-l;e•""·Uo::;;;estimate"?an""'"8-arn~ 
,.,., or ·wage·"function. ·Further, no ,information was· obtained ·on--the-hours ·o'f"work""in 
each job. Hence an hours of work equation could not be estimated. 
The major merit of these data was detailed information on multiple activity 
choices. Hence these data are used to study the determinants of occupational 
choice in rural India, in terms of single and multiple jobs and combinations of 
wage and self employed jobs. 
'''"·•·••'-••\•··• .,,.. , .:,Abouu,-,,5,3,,,wpe,r-0ent-••·G£,-adu-l-t-ma-le•-wo:rker-s""Cabove ·-14-,years ·••and--e~rn-1-ud-i-ng---studenes·) 
and 61 perc.ent of. adult women workers held more than one job in c:the 30 sample 
•·villages of:·Gujarat in the agricultural •year 1987-88· (Table ·1). This·-presents a 
strong. case fo.r .analysing.,:the.determinants,of multiple.job holding in India,- The 
,..... , percentage of. individuals. holding,,·,only one Job ,,was .highest ,-.(about- 73 percent) 
···· ·among·'1llale· salaried employees; followed by the-·self 0 employed'{44 percent) ~and 'tl'ie 
r·"r, · wage employed '°'(37 ..,percent) (Table l·). -Among the· female workers, the number of 
··· salaried employees was small (118) .···The percentage of-female wage workers holding 
only one job was the lowest (34 percent). 
in Table 2 by sex and alternative employment status-groups. 
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- ,,. ,., ..._,,,. -.· .... THE,.,OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL. AND .STAT.ISTICALTESTS 
· possible for .the ;consumer .. to make ·continous ··substitution --of one, -good·{or 
characteristic) for another through market transactions. However, many important 
choices that an individual makes are discrete, such as occupational choice 
(Pudney, 1989). 
In general, the reduced form of the occupational choice equation for each 
· individual is derived from an-indirect utility function -(V) ,which-is, obtained by 
, .the constrained maximization of the utility function. V1J.is .the maximum utility 
,, indirect utility "function· can-be decomposed into a non-stochastic component: {X) 
and stochastic component(£) 
characteristics (value of land holding and value of other productive assets) and 
regional characteristics (a---village·wage•variable and distance--from- the nearest 
town). The probability that the i th individual will choose the j th activity status 
is 
•{19) 
·,If the stochastic components 0 have . independent",•and ,Weibull. distributions, ,the 
i thchoice model is..,a multinomial logit ...The ..probability. that the _.. individual 
chooses the j th activity status reduces -- to 
(20) 
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" .. ,,.,.,w1- ...,c;_,,.,,"'""'""'..Mc.Eadd@,.,~.19,Z.4~,,,.s.u.gge.s..1:.rui. ..a ..L.c.an.di;t:i.o.nal.::Lo,g~,d,e.Lf.,::,,wb.i.ch :consi-de.r.s.- t:he--effaCl;!s 
of the characteristics of the choice and the individual agent in the 
determination of the choice probabilities (Domencich and McFadden, 1975). The 
multinomial logit model considered here make the choice porobabilities dependent 
on individual characteristics only (Schmidt and Strauss, 1975; Maddala, 1983). 
The weakness of the multinomial logit model is that the probability of any pair 
of states depends exclusively on characteristics of the two states concerned, and 
is independent of the· number and nature - of all other states - that are 
simultaneously considered. The odds ratio is therefore not affected by the 
.c~~-c;·,"-+!mlii-~t:. s:;,--.•<;"-',addi-t:.Lo.n.;;.o~del..ati-on-,.,,0£.~>-B.n."',a,l-te:i::nati,,v,ew,..,This~,p:i:.:oper,ty~-·":i,s""'k;nown-,,,a,s,.,i,ndepend&Flee 
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Cramer, 1991). 
-,,., .. To analyse, the dat:e.rminants _of,, o.c.cupational choice -,£our... models are-specified 
(Chart 1).·The .first model is a simple dichotomous choice between labor force 
participation and--remaining~'outside · the·· labor force· (non-worker: status). The 
,,.;;;; .second model "poses a trichotomous choice of non-work, one job- only and more--than 
one job. The.·· third model · introduces the choice of self employment and wage 
employment as single and multiple job choices. And finally the fourth model 
distinguishes between the choice to work in two jobs in the same or different 
·. ·sectors ,(agriculture .and non-agriculture) .. At.,each,-s tage ,, ,where a:new..al-te-rnati:ve 
is introduced, a statistical. test for whether,"'the subset of new alternatives can 
be treated as a single state ..is ...conducted. 
If the original model had two choices or two states, at each stage (each new 
model) we are introducing a new distinction within state j. This will always lead 
15 
to .an extended model with (j+l) states, two new states and beingj 1 j 2 
j 2 have the same regressor coefficients, which are those of their parent state; 
but their intercepts differ (Cramer and Ridder, 1991). To test for the pooling 
of states for each new logit model we therefore need to test for the equality of 
their logit regressor coefficient apart from the intercept. This can be done with 
a likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis is that 





- Log 4} (21) 
where 
/'-
log L is the max"imum ·· 1og likelihood of the original" model and 
/',.
4 the 
•maximum.• log . likelihood ... ,if--, the estimates are,. constrainted- as. in-----the-.. null 
hypothesis. -,LR is distributed as a ·chi-square variate with k degrees of freedom 
· where k•· is the--number-·of-"Lestrictions - imp•lied by the null"~hypothesi:s·;-•Log·~--rs 
· ic"readily..:iavailahle.,-, ,but -::4.,r.equires ..constrainted estimation ,which· is laborious-. " 
•However, ·Cramer· and Ridder, 1991, present a simple method to ·compute- ·it and· a 
· complete·description·of the.above methodology. 
A second method to test for the validity of choices in each model is a Wald Test . 
._.The.null hypothesis is /3Jl-=;; /3Jz, where only the slope. coefficients are tested and 
not the intercept. 
For comparison of the.. empirical :results the marginal effects or ...partial 
· derivatives are computed·-and·then ·converted into¥•quasi-elast-icities .-Thepartra:1 
. •;,derivative indicates the impact of the independent variable X on the probability 
of choice j. To make this independent of the unit of measurement, the quasi-
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elasticities ('7jk) are evaluated at the sample·means·(Cramer, 1991). 
where j indicates the activity choices and k the elements of the independent 
variable vector X. '7jk indicates the percentage point change in Pj upon a 
one percent increase in Xk. These measures satisfy 
Quasi-,elasticities·are superior to the fJ coefficients and to derivatives by their 
t·~ease\,0£:"in.te.r,px.e.tatio.n'i'--"'but like· their derivatives they ·too, may· change +sign as 
.well as value when they are evaluated at different points ..Quasi-,elasticities are 
"reported in·parentheses in ·the tables . 
.,. A likelihood ratio ..index or.,.a. coefficient. of. determination can .be-• defined. whieh 
is analogous to·the·leastsquares multiple correlation coefficient, 
P
2 = 1 -~ (24)
L('30) 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Model 1 and 2 
.. The results of the dichotomous· and the, trichotomous ·,logit -equat-ions are·presented 
"in T,ables 3a and 3b. The model is ~estimated ,separately.. ,for ,males and--,females •to 
see,if there are any significant differences in-the determinants of choices by 
sex. The choice of not working.is ..omitted.as ..a,reference, category to identify"the 
model in both cases. 
, The .test statistic LR is constructed for testing the .,parameter restrictions •· 
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/3one job ;= f3two jobs in the trichotomous model. This test indicates, at the . 005 
•~t-1,x,,,,,,,,,.,~.,,..,,,,,.-.,,,,,,,J.e;v.el,,,G.f,,...s..i,gni£.icance,,,.,,a,~v.alue_...0£.,,2,2,,,,0.•,w,i,th,,,.S..,.d~g,1;e,es.,,-.o,£,,~,e,eda1Tu,~..Xhe,.J..R"'i,s,.,ah0¥e-
,this ·level in the male· equation ·(689 in Table 3a) and··,the null hypothesis··•rs 
rejected at any conventional level of significance. Thus the trichotomous model 
does not collapse into the dichotomous model and provides further insight into 
the participation decision. The Wald Test, also a chi-square with 8 degrees of 
freedom, rejects the null hypothesis of parameter restrictions in the 
trichotomous model as well. 
The female participation decision also appears to be a trichotomous choice rather 
A,e>,~'''"'' .:,c,,,~,.. ,,;,,__.,",,.;\;;,th-an,;,.,a,.,dfaihot.omo.us./4.ona...~,The;~LR...,and-,~Wal,d,~te:s,t,.,s.tat.is,tic.,;c;learly,,'.i:.:e.j..ects:: . :.the•.~:Ll 
hypothesis that /3one job = f3two jobs. The dichotomous model misspecifies the 
·"·underlying choice-· framework;" The «female dichotomous occupational••choice·decision 
(Table 3b) is less welLexplained. by,.the. model than is the male decision .(.p2 is 
smaller). However, the trichotomous model equally well explains the male and 
female choices (p2 's are similar). 
,The 0·results of··models 1 and 2 are discussed in·the next section alongcwith the 
results of model 3 which is of primary interest to us. 
Model 3 
.,,,., The third model disaggregates, the one •job and,·two.,Job choices further into self 
employed and wage jobs ...we consider five activity choices, non-work, --self 
'' ' employment as a single activity ,(se) ~--wage.s•employment·· as•,·-a single·~act·ivity:{we-h· 
primarily self employment with either self or wage employment as a second job 
(seow), primarily wage employment with either self-or wage employment as a second 
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.'",. activity (weow). The results are presented in Tables 4a and b ..As previously,. the 
,,.,1t,·,, ,. cM.•"'•·'''"''"'·,,,,a,_,-,,;0:hQJ,c~,"'8£~0:rking. -j s am j ,ttedc.as.,..a.,r..e,fea;:e.n,e,e~e~or.y,.,.,sJ;.o,.,..i,den~~ 
The polychotomous occupational choice model equally well explains the male and 
female job choices as indicated by the p2 for the two equations. The LR and Wald 
test statistics are computed for the male and female equations to check whether 
the parameters in the two specifications are equal. The null hypothesis is as 
follows: 
13se = 13we = l3onejob 13 seow = 13 weow = 13 twojobs 
The test indicates, at, the . 005 level of significance, a ..value of .32 ..0 with .,16 
degrees of•.freedom. The-•LR- ,and •WaldH,statist-ics are clearly above· this 0level·=in 
both the male and.female.,equations~and the nulL:hy.pothesis,is rejected. Thus 'the 
polychotomous model is a valid-specification of multiple activity choices•;"'A · 
.1, - Self.,,.emp,loyment.~,is.,.:regarded ·.· as -. being., ,more,..risky -. than ...paid . employment-·. so· that 
attitudes to risk matter in the occupational choice .. In the context of developed 
countries, it- is hypothesized.by some authors that a less,risk-averse individual 
is · more likely to, choose · self employment (Rees and Shah, 1986). Another 
hypothesis is that the choice of self-versus-wage employment is based on 
'managerial ability' (Blau, 1985) .. 
The wage employed group in this model includes both casual daily wage-earners· and 
, persons with regular salaried jobs.· Obviously,this is not a homogeneous -group 
with the, latter having much_ higher levels of education than the former. The 
· .. :::casual daily workers, in the developed country context, constantly face the risk 
of:·unemployment. In such a situation the choice of .occupation is more likely to 
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be based on the asset position (or educational level) of the individual rather 
,,,..•,,,. ec·',""'' .. ,~ ,,•.,,0,1bhan,~a,tt,i,,tudeS,;:il:O,·...r,isks.B,Lau.,..,1,,,LR8~,},mal.s,o.,.,,£,o,und'i;,t:i.h&t·,,.J.-and,,,3.:a~t;,haa~t.mana~,., 
ability' was an important factor in determining the choice into self employment 
in agriculture in rural Malaysia. 
Human Capital: A major similarity between the dichotomous and trichotomous 
participation decision for males is that labor force participation is higher in 
the younger age groups (Table 3a). However, the trichotomous model suggests that 
younger workers. are ,more likely to·hold two· jobs than -a .. single job. A large 
, positive elasticity of the younger age group on holding two jobs is observed. In 
'•.:)i+s1,.•,,_.•::;?c'f",,,.;,,,,,~r:0.the.:;,older;:,age,.:groups..:::holdingc.,:a.·.;s.ingle:;.j.ob.,,i,s,1thei,~pre•.f,erre.d:::cho.i.ce:.::::l!'he::c:-av.e.r_g.ge· 
age at which the probability of multiple jobs peaks is 34years. It is perhaps 
the i:ige at which young •men get·settled ··i:nto their jobs ·and ·are"able·,-to·-give'"·up 
a second job, if they..had one. The results are more or .less similar for women •in 
the two models ,(Table 3b). The age at which multiple Job holdings for women·peak 
is lower, at 31 years, as compared to the men. 
In model 3 also, .alLthe job choices show a higher participation, in the younger 
age groups, and a tapering off in the older age groups for both male and female 
workers (Tables 4a and b). When the choices are split into self and wage employed 
. "Jobs; '"the 'probability :of."self ··employment· :as ";a:s:singi'e·c.activity is--found·-to-:-:-be 
preferred among . the older.. men -(quasi-elasticity is. ,positive for this -choice 
, only). The turning point·for· the..·activity choice is··37'years among self··employed 
·. men while it is 33. years among the wage .employed .men., The corresponding ,,ages ..for 
self employed women is 35 years. and for wage employed -women -is 26 years. •· 
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.In the trichotomous model education has a, significant negative effect on holding 
holding •.;.only,,.one job. ,This could occur due. to various.. ,reasons .. as ..hypothesized 
earlier. Education ·has a significant negative ·impact on femal·e·1>arti-cipation not 
just on holding two jobs as observed in the case of males. However, the quasi­
elasticity does show a small positive influence of education on holding a single 
job in the case of women. 
Higher,levels of education are observed to lead to.single job choices for male 
workers in model 3 also (Table 4a). -The positive impact of education on the 
•'discussed earlier5 .,, Education has a·,-rpos·itive :·influence on, the •'choice, of ·self 
employment as a single ac.tivi,ty. Tt is hypothesized to enhance the- individual 
performance directly or indirectly through better access .to capital among the 
educated workers. 
-1 ; Among.•female.workers, however, education had a significant negative influence on 
all job choices. A small positive elasticity is noted for single self employed 
jobs alone (Table 4b). 
of land holdings and valae .,of. ,other ,,productive,.,,.assets excluding .,land .. ,· The 
dichotomous and trichotomous models-,are similar in terms of,.a -positive·- influence 
,.. -,of .-the, value . of other .productive assets, on ,pa:r:tic,ipation. Both single,.. and 
5If the choice is restricted to regular salaried jobs the positive impact 
··••of1·education is significant.· The results of this model are not reported here. 
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multiple job holdings are similarly affected. The elasticities however indicate 
· It was hypothesized earlier that a higher value of physical assets would 
encourage single jobs. However, this does not seem to be the case. Two possible 
reasons for this are possible. The first, included in our theoretical model, is 
the seasonality of work leading to restriction on the number of days in the first 
job. The second possible reason, not included in the model, is uncertainty or 
risk in the first,activity which.might encourage diversification into a,second 
job. 
, The value of land holding,1variahle was introduced"i.n quadratic form •-to "S'ee i'f ~i·t 
influences the emergence of a second.job at low levels, -while increasing; the 
chance of specialization in self ,employment at higher levels. The ·•trichotomous 
model suggests · that. the• inverted U ,shaped relationship ·• is significant--~for 
multiple,,,job holding (Tables 3a and b). However,"'it is only a few large land 
·\ holders (:with.. value of land·around Rs. 630,000) who undertake.only one.activity. 
·-Thus again physical assets,,,in terms of land,-''·encourage diversi.fication into'a 
second job rather than foster specialization by relaxing the capital constraint. 
· ··'·"'""''''"""1 ,1·"'-~'"clfhe,,-i:nve"t"ued··-U-"shaped-re:.I:at·i-e-nshi-p·~for.,,,the0 "Valcue•"OT"~]_,and~"Var'.i:ab-1-e.,,.i-s =s1.-gni:£tC'ant 
, 
0 --for the primarily .self employed.workers who, undertake ,a second activity·-,(Tables 
4a and b). However, as observed in the case of multiple job holders in-model 2, 
the ,turning point is again .at a·very -high value of,•land,(Rs. 6Q5, 000 -for•men and 
Rs. 638,000 for women) . That. is, only a few large land holders.:·undertake only one 
activity. Among the primarily self employed women, .however, a higher value -of 
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land appears to. encourage participation in a single activity as well. The value 
1,,.,,, ,.,.-,,.,,,.,.;,,,,iw,,;-t",.,'"""''·ef,l,,produc•t4v.:e...;,asse,ts,,~o:the.:r,,",:than~1,ikand~as,.i;,a,;ij;pos,-i,t;;Lv:e.:~'!Lmpac,t;w.ons.»bo,th,,,,.s,i,sngJ.-e,~ 
•· ·« ... J :multiple jobs;:among:the. self-·. employed..Thus, .. ·a·higher ,value~.;of.::physical capital 
does not-,necessarily,,lead to specialization even among the ·self employed. The 
relationship appears to be more complex than hypothesized. 
The relationship observed for the value of land variable suggests that the job 
choices of the landed and landless persons may be different. Among the male 
workers 2853 are landless while 3117 have some operational land holding. Among 
the landless 68 percent hold a single job, while about 73 percent-of the -landed 
.,1;.,;.,,;,,.:"''"i.•-. ·_,,,;•,,,.i..,.c1:sl.•t!MmaiLes,ii,unde,rta~e;:,,mU:l,ta-ple,\t.3,obs-4.;,"'Q.f:,;,:the·,,i,landed,:"ma1es ,.,,,l,601,,,i\a,:t'ei••,s-e1,f•:i•empl:eyed,a1!l1ild 
·, -of these 408 (25 -percent)..;;,undertake only, a single activity. Among the :1and±e-ss 
males 849 are self· employed of whom 660 (78 percent) undert:akP. only A sfoe;l P. Joh. 
The preferred choice .of the landless males is a single job. Moreover, it appears 
that the landed .. primarily self employed men prefer multiple jobs,- while the 
landless sel-f employed men prefer single jobs. Among the landed self employed it 
is perhaps the .. ,large land holders.· who specialize in, one activity. , This 
disaggregation helps to explain the complex job preferences of the self employed 
and what appears as a significant U-shaped relation to the value of land. 
External ,Regional Factors :.,..To ..capture .the .... impact..of,.saccess to .and availab.iLiet;y 
of employment opportunities, ·,,,distance-from ·the··•nearest town is included ·in the 
,·.analysis. It has a positive influence on labor.participation. The trichotomous 
··model however suggests, .. that the further is the ·village from a town the ·greater 
•is the chance of multiple job holding. Similar results are obtained in the case 
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,,, .of wage. and .. self employment as primary.. choices-. (Tables 4a and b). This is 
,-. •··· ··• · ,,,,,,.,,\--11., /,·,t:-.,~-w.;surp·r4s,ingr,iis.inee,;•,one-"'wouLd:cr:e:x:p.eoo-"';;mo:r..e:i\,;0,pp,o,r~1:1nii,u-:L.es1e~i£o,r.,,wJ,ob~ibose:r-""A:o"'zoowg..~..-
. ,;::ci:t'· .However,,:,as .,noted<•earlier~ ,-higher0;wage- -levels .·-in ,,urban, areas··,-could 'explain,,·.th-is 
choice. Further, multiple job preferences in distant villages probably reveals 
the need for diversification of activities to compensate for lower income levels 
in these remoter areas and reduce uncertainties from one job alone. 
The village wage had a negative impact on multiple job holdings. The elasticity 
shows that the effect of the village wage on a single job was positive as 
· hypothesized•,(Tables 3a and b) .. The :village wage variable also has .a negative 
,.,,,_..:,,.,,.,,.;;,,,.,.,·.. ,..,.,,,:i,:,iic,,,M,fan£1ueno.e,,..:on.\,,mul.tipl.e:,.t.J:,ob.s.:.among:,,,p:r,ima:n.Lly:.. ,s-el£,.,;and,.:cwa,ge;,,emp:1oy:ed•,men~(,Tab.~a 
and b). Among women-cc,workers ... though ...both single and multiple Job""choices,.are 
discouraged by a higher village wage. The elasticities of village wage.however 
show that multiple:jobs among men·and women are more common.the lower the village 
wage. 
iP .. ,., .•-.To,,"'r,S1.llll,1,,~,"the,;,:,.tri.chotomous model. provides.-suggestive. insights into household 
behaviour when faced with seasonality of work and uncertainty in rural India, 
Persons who undertake single jobs appear to be older, better educated or have a 
very high value of land or other productive assets .. Equipped with these sources 
.·.'-~. -..::,<- - :~:'r:r,,~,,~of.-,~-human;.,.,and~,-Ph¥s i.cal.;;,,capital.;;.~these.,,,.-tndt:v:,idua.1s"~r,e4hypo thesizecL: -to.-.,.,h-av.e..""h-i:.gher. 
,+income streams and are. better ..insulated agains.t ,uncer.tainties in their.,fields....:of 
activity. Higher levels of. physical capital, ••Mhowever, appears to - encourage 
•,. ,diversification .,.into. a .. second Job. Lower."wages ..and,,greater distance ..from ...the 
towns also encourage multiple jobs;This can.be,-...seen as --diversification--t-0 
increase income levels and deal with uncertainties. 
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,.,:,.,, :_,, 1,.,,,,.,,~,-•,·., •ti,;.,,!01•,N!lJheMp0,l~oho,tlomeus,dllede.L~,sug.g-es:t:.s.,,,.,.,t;ha,t,i0R•iLghe,,r,,,waihue,,1'i>,f1J4')h}T,-&ihcah.:eap,:Lt::al-~,land:::mitd 
,.,, ,,,.u;•,,:,. >:,,,,,.,,,;+ ,; ,,.,',;o,ther:::,:as.sets;),,among.. .the..s.elf ..empl.oyed .. need.,no.t, .;lead.. ,tO";;Specialization. ,.Howeve.r , 
among ,the self employed men without land specialization does -0ccur.---It is likely 
that the value of other assets variable captures agricultural assets better than 
non-agricultural assets and hence shows a positive relation with multiple jobs. 
Among primarily wage employed persons, younger, less educated persons faced with 
lower wages undertake multiple jobs. In both cases greater distance from the town 
appears to encourage diversification of occupations. The policy significance of 
these results.are discussed in the conclusion. 
Model 4 
Tn t:he finRl mo<lP-1 WP. hRvP. fnrt:hP.r-split: t:he c.hoic.P. of multiple johs Rmone·sP.lf 
and wage employed ,persons into whe,ther they undertake .two activities in the. same 
or different· sectors. The sectors. ·are defined· broadly as agriculture and" non·­
agriculture. There are six choices in this model. The six groups consist of non-
..... ·""' ,..,,(:,• ,,~·Y,1: ~p:i:Jq:~r$,,,1.p.e~sans_..w,i th,.,qnly. one ,.job, .. primarily self employed workers with two jobs 
in· different sectors (sed) or in the same sector (ses) ,and primarily wage 
employed workers with two jobs in different sectors (wed) or in the same sector 
. (wes). •The underlying assumption here is that persons .undertake two jobs in 
,, ..,,,,,dif,ferent,.,sec.to.rs..to.. reduce.,unce.rtainti.es.,and,:,div:ersify.. r.isks .. , The .res.ults...of.:...t:he 
male equation. are .presented in_. Table .5 ....The ... LR,"test •,statistic for .the ..£emale 
,equation could not. be computed. since, the, pooled ..,model,. did not converge ..,..The 
, , , .. ,, ,,.,.,.,,"results... are presented .in .Appendix ,Table, .L.and, ,are..... more. :,or,. less ,.similar.....to .... ci;ie 
male equation. 
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.. Thed.R and Wald test statistics are computed for -the following null hypothesis: 
The test statistics are chi-·squaresw -with 16 ·degrees ·of· ·freedom. ·· The null 
hypothesis ,is,,rejected at any conventional level ;of significance.' Model 4 is a 
valid specification and provides insight into another dimension of 
diversification by self employed workers. 
In general the results of this model are similar to that observed for the earlier 
,.ones ..However.,".-c,one,:-s.ignificant result which provides insight into risk averse 
behaviour of self ·employed ·persons is· ·highlighted below. 
•In the •earlie•r··models-i-t-was-"0bse-rve-d-that· the ·primarily·-self employed-men-with 
land preferred multiple jobs,· except at a. very high value of land. In -the 
extended model this relationship is found· to be significant-for self employed 
workers undertaking·two jobs in different sectors. The value of land at which 
multiple jobs peak is again very high at about Rs. 618,000. Only few large land 
i>c holde•rs•, speciali-ze-·in ·one ·.activity. The value ,.of other productive assets has a 
significant positive effect ..on both self and.wage ,employed-men who.,undertake- a 
second activity in a different sector. Thus self employed workers-with land not 
only prefer multiple jobs, but also tend to diversify into activities in 
different sectors. This is·-"perhaps an ·attempt ·to diversify risks ·and re-duce 
uncertainties, particularly in agriculture. · 
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, "' .CONCLUSIONS 
.,,.,,,,,,_,.,,•. ,.,.:•,.,.,,¥,1"•Wi'"''';,A,i,.~La;r,ge1,,ti,pr,,0po.r,ti,on,,,,,,,,,o.f".,"'the."".Jmdi;1i.ra,.aua:Jis""j\i.'nw,.it'<u~a,h,,.iL,nd:lia,i.,,u,ndea::;1:ak-e-.,;,,,mor.-e,;,,J:.ha,a~e-
·" · '' , · · '·· "economic',-activity. ,such diversification could,occur due •to -seasonality of' work 
or uncertainties and -fluctuating incomes from a ·single agricultural or non­
agricultural activity. The single activity model ignores the fact of multiple job 
choices among the rural population. It misses the possible rationales for such 
choices and consequently may be misleading for policy. 
The polychotomous model suggests that, persons who undertake multiple jobs are 
younger, less educated,- are faced with lower wage rates and live further away 
..-:,--. ,,.,,.,,,,,.,:,;,._.·,•s"h'''"~'.£-r-0m,..,.t,o;wns_,_'",:rhe..,,,in.fluence".,..0£.-..J:he."JTAlua.,.o..f.,.,,.phy,9.i.c.aL.,,,c,apj_,:taLN.o;n,,.,.J.ob_.cho,i..ce.s-i.s 
complex. Higher value of--land-and other assets encourage, diversification inter-a 
second activity, except at a very high ·value·•of land,· among self e.mployed·men. 
Further disaggregation, however, reveals that while this is true for· ·self 
employed men with land, landless self employed men prefer to specialize in a 
single activity. Finally, model 4 suggests that the self employed workers with 
land also .tend. to ..undertake two activities in different sectors. This can be 
interpreted as risk-averse diversification. 
Overall, the analysis in this paper suggests that the labor market in developing 
·, ·c·ountries ·is··complex. ·•Bes ide•S",·•the··•occupational··cho•ices··"Observed"·in·rurai"Guj'arat 
also reflect the .specific. agro-climatic. conditions of. this state, descr.ibed 
earlier, and the ·drought-condit:i:ons-prevaiHmg· ,in-·-the ·year of survey.· 
The multiple job holding model directs attenti·on ·towards the problems involvetl 
i,, ,,inproduction activity in.rural India ... Some,.of.,,these,are low productivity--on 
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''-'·•i, ,,. ., •.,self employed jobs, dependence on.,the ..weather in.. agriculture and some related 
", .,.,,,,,. ,. employment.;c,The,,model analyses determinants,.of multiple ,,job choices which . , .• 
emphasize. the relevance .of some_.policies, needed to .improve. ,productiv:i.ty and 
•,,reduce .,risks •·in rural, activities .. These ,include ,policies·. to:. 
l.Improve educational facilities at all levels to increase productivity and 
raise wage levels, and 
2.Develop infrastructure, e.g., roads and public transportation facilities to 
increase the mobility of workers in remote villages to enable them to take 
advantage of job opportunities in towns and other villages. 
Besides, uncertainties.. and risk in production could be reduced and restriction 
on. the days of self, employed~.activity .-could be. relaxed ~through.,.developing new 
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Table 1: Occupational Choice by Activity 1 and 2 
·Activity Status 2 
Activity Self Wage 
Status 1 Employed Employed Salaried ; Nonworker 
MALE 









Wage 818 368 29 715 
Employed 42.4 19.1 1.5 37.1 
44.0 37.1 47.5 23.4 
Salaried 263 45 7 857 
22.4 3.8 0.6 73.1 
14.2 4.5 11.5 28.0 
Nonworker 0 0 0 418 
0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 
Total 1858 993 61 3058 
FEMALE 
Self 1088 388 4 969 
Employed 44.4 15.8 0.2 39.6 
59.9 56.5 25.0 27.1 
Wage 711 290 11 531 
Employed 46.1 18.8 0.7 34.4 
39.2 42.2 68.7 15.0 
Salaried 15 9 1 93 
12.7 7.6 0.8 78.1 
0.8 1.3 6.2 2.6 
Nonworker 0 0 0 1937 
0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 54.9 












alndicates row percentages. 
blndicates column percentages. 
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Table 2: Sample Means by Employment Status 
Male Female 
Model 1 Nonworker Worker Nonworker Worker 
Variables (418) (5550) (1937) (4110) 
Age 53.2 35.0 40.9 33.1 
Education 2.4 2.7 2.2 1.6 
Value of Land 32452.5 28860.4 20365.3 31466.3 
Value of Assets 7409.6 7915.6 5325.9 9055.6 
Distance from Town 13.2 14.6 13.0 15.4 
Village Wage 9.7 9.5 10.0 9.3 
Male Female 
Model2 One Job Two Jobs One Job Two Jobs 
Variables (2640) (2912) (1593) (2517) 
Age 35.1 34.8 33.6 32.7 
Education 3.0 2.4 1.9 1.5 
Value of Land 23711.7 33542.8 18184.1 39879.1 
Value of Assets 6334.8 9354.4 5669.5 11203.8 
Distance from Town 13.0 16.0 14.2 16.3 
Village Wage 9.9 9.1 9.7 9.1 
Male 
Model 3 SE WE SE,OW WE,OW 
Variables (1068) (1572) (1382) (1530) 
Age 39.4 32.2 36.7 33.1 
Education 2.9 3.0 2.5 2.3 
Value of Land 32273.7 11635.8 47769.4 27078.2 
Value of Assets 11818.6 2633.0 13435.5 5629.8 
Distance from Town 14.3 12.1 16.0 16.0 













Value of Land 
Value of Assets 









































Value of Land 
Value of Assets 
































Figures in parentheses are number of observations. 
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Table 3a: Maximum Likelihood Dichotomous and 
Trichotomous Logit Estimates of Model 1 and 2; Male 
Model 
(1) (2) 
· · Participation ' 
One Job Two Jobs 
Intercept .595 -.229 -.271 
(1.31) (-.50) (-.57) 
Age .186 .155 .231 
(10.14) (8.27) (11.65) 
[.290] [-.48 ] [.806] 
Age Squared (10-2) -.273 -.231 -.334 
(-13.48) (-11.31) (-14.95) 
[-.180] [.277] [-.478] 
Education -.049 .093 -.222 
f-1.081 f1.981 f-4.671-.006 .194 -.201 
Value of Land (10-4) -.004 -.013 .049
(- 551 f-1.831 f5.15J[-.00 ] -.042 .044 
Value of Land Squared (10-9) -.000 .002 -.005 
(-.41J (.78J t6.21l[-.00 ] [.02 ] -.029 
Value of Assets (10-3) .011 .007 .011 
(1.89) (2.791f2.84l.003 [-.005] [.008 
Distance from Town .021 .001 .045 
(.08)f2.601 f5.371.013 [-.147] .162 
Village Wage -.035 .017 -.088 
f-.1631 (.75J (-3.941
-.014 [.22 ] [-.244 
Log Likelihood -1153.13 -46.50.24 
x2 722.71 1413.21 
. p2 0.24 .13 
LR 689.01 
Wald Test 594.56 
•.~'.·j,. ..-. 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios. 
Figures in square bracketsd are quasi-elasticities. 
· · ·· · Nonparticipation is the residual choice. 
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Table 3b: Maximum Likelihood Dichotomous and 
.Trichotomons Logit Estimates of Model 1 and 2; Female 
Model 
(2)p .(~) . · · artic1pation 
One Job Two Jobs 
Intercept .168 -.710 -.451 
(.67) (-2.44) (-1.56) 
Age .139 .110 .167 
(12.34)?2.141 i8.4111.027 .114 [.959) 
Age Squared (10-2) -.221 -.176 -.264 
'(-15.62) (-10.83) (-15.41) 
[-.689) [-.079) [-.640) 
Education -.495 -.334 -.646 
(-19.52) (-11.52) (-21.35) 
[-.188) [.013) [-.211) 
Value of Land (10-4) .018 -.004 .031 
(-.49) t5.171?.331.011 [-.012] .022 
Value of Land Squared (10-9) -.002 .002 -.003 
i-2.521 (.18, i-4.081
-.009 [.00 ] -.002 
Value of Assets (10-3) .012 .007 .016 
(5,371 (2.37) (6.701
[.020 [-.004) [.025 
Distance from Town .036 .017 .051 
. (10.55) (3.S0J?.241.109 [-.03 ] [.148) 
Village Wage -.072 -.031 -.105 
(-2.34)f-6.361 f-8.401-.142 [.058) -.207 
Log Likelihood -3157.28 -5732.27 
x2 1269.74 1608.83 
p2 .17 .12 
LR 339.09 
Wald Test 296.41 
·-· -:'·'. • . -.W,} 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios. 
Figures in square bracketsd are quasi-elasticities. 
·· N onparticipation is the residual choice. · 
37 
Table 4a: Maximum Likelihood Polychotomous Logit Estimate . 
Intercept 
Age 
Age Squared (10-2) 
Education 
Value of Land (10-4) 
Value of Land Squared (10-9) 










of Model 3: Male 
One Job Multiple Jobs 
Self Employed Wage 
Self Wage with Employed with 
Employed Employed Second Job Second Job 
-1.627 -1.438 -1.475 -1.143 
(-3.35) (-2.851) (-2.97) (-2.29) 
.144 .245 .244 .268 
(7.49) (11.16) (11.70) (12.32) 
[-.551) [.219) [.239) [.515) 
-.195 -.373 -.335 -.398 
(-9.27) (-14.19) (-14.09) ( -15.36) 
[.380) [-.195) [-.083) [-.360) 
.111 .059 -.170 -.281 
(2.23) (1.19) (-3.42) (-5.646) 
[.108) [.081) [-.056) [-.144) 
.012 -.028 .058 -.007 
(1.15) (-2.48) (5.78) (-.964) 
[.003) [-.023) [.035) [-.013) 
-.014 .026 -.046 .001 
(-1.814) (1.521) (-5.83) (.64) 
[-.000) [.009) [-.020) [.010) 
.001 -.056 .011 .000 
(3.28) (-8.30) (3.40) (.022) 
[.028) [-.082) [.035) [.016) 
0'7".I -.018 .045 .039 
(2.57) (-2.07) (5.04) (4.45) 
[.000) [-.128) [.079) [.067) 
,VMJ 
.007 .032 -.106 -.065 
(.30) (1.34) (-4.53) (-2.80) 






C ',t~ "~ 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios. 
•Figures in square bracketsd are quasi-elasticities. 
Nonparticipation is the residual choice. 
38 
Table 4b: Maximum Likelihood Polychotomous Logit Estimate 
Female 
Multiple Jobs 
Self Employed Wage 
Wage with Employed with 
Employed Second Job Second Job 
-.279 -2.03 -.008 
(-.66) (-6.15) (-.022) 
.101 .191 .139 
(4.95) (12.45) (7.64) 
[.005) [.843) [.211) 
-.196 -.283 -.250 
(-7.28) (-14.53) (-10.36) 
[-.030) [-.495) (-.213) 
-.667 -.463 -1.024 
(-14.56) (-14.13) (-20.17) 
[-.028) [-.059) [-.184) 
-.042 .086 .004 
(-1.79) (9.88) (.61) 
[-.009) [.042) [-.009) 
.004 -.067 -.000 
(.59) (-6.99) ( -.099) 
[-.003) [-.027) [.008) 
-.160 .017 .000 
(-9.17) (6.68) (.041) 
[-.057) [.035) [.001) 
.023 .050 .055 
(3.42} (9.22) (9.36) 
[-.001) [.092) [.064) 
-.016 -.099 -.104 
(-.91) (-7.13} (-6.68) 








Age Squared (10-2) 
Education 
Value of Land (lo-4) 
Value of Land Squared.(10-9) 
Value of Assets (10-3) 





































Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios. 
· Figures in square bracketsd are quasi-elasticities. 
N onparticipation is the residual choice. 
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Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Polychotomous Logit Estimate 
of Model 4: Male 
One Job Multiple Jobs 
Jobs in Different Sectors Jobs in Same Sector 
Self Wage Self Wage 














































































































[.239] (-.084] (-.111] (-.072] (.012] 




Wald Test 112.76 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios. 
Figures in square bracketsd are quasi-elasticities. 
Nonparticipation is the residual choice. 
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·,; ·~•,., Appendix Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Polychotomous Logit Estimate ,,,;, ,,~; ,,'>/ 
of Model 4: Female 
One Job Multiple Jobs 
Jobs in Different Sectors Jobs in Same Sector 
Seti Wage Self Wage 
Only Employed Employed Employed Employed 
Intercept -.688 -2.518 -.618 -2.262 -.861 
(-2.35) (-7.15) (-1.44) (-3.79) (-1.65) 
Age .109 .198 .153 .162 .118 
(8.27) (12.08) ( 7.13) (5.62) (4.64) 
[.139] [.683] [·-.176] [.084] [.037] 
Age Squared (10-2) -.174 -.290 -.271 -.257 -.218 
(-10.73) (-13.89) (-9.31) (-6.80) (-6.41) 
[-.102] [-.387] [.155] [-.057] [-.047] 
Education -.335 -.436 -1.027 -.642 -.994 
(-11.52) (-12.70) (-16.87) (-9.32) (-12.63) 
[.007] [-.047] [-.108] [-.019] [-.057] 
Value of Land (10-4) .007 .100 -.002 .037 .042 
(0.70) (10.36) (-.27) (1.27) (2.57) 
[-.015] [.040] [-.006] [.001] [.002] 
Value of Land Squared (10-9) -.001 -.008 .001 -.007 -.003 . 
(-1.17) (-6.87) (.52) (-.70) (-1.94) 
[.009] [-.027] [.005] [-.004] [-.001] 
Value of Assets (10-3) .005 .016 .005 .006 -.002 
(1.95) (6.42) (1.02) (1.11) (-.29) 
[.000] [.016] [-.000] [.000] [-.003] 
Distance from Town .018 .042 .053 .079 .059 
(3.56) (7.45) (8.19) (8.50) (7.25) 
[-.028] [.050] [.038] [.030] [.024] 
Village Wage -.030 -.082 -.108 -.189 -.111 
(-2.32) (-5.58) (-6.09) (-7.56) (-5.13) 
·.,[.048] [-.063] [-.051] ·. [-.049] [-.030] 
Log Likelihood -8575.49 
'X,2 2092.15 
p2 .11 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios. 
Figures in square bracketsd are quasi-elasticities. 
N onparticipation is the residual choice. 
